

# Table of Contents

Acknowledgments .....	IX
Prologue .....	1
1 Introduction .....	3
1.1 What Is Uncontroversial About Moral Disagreement? .....	4
1.2 What Is Controversial About Moral Disagreement? .....	7
1.3 The Method and Structure of this Investigation .....	10
1.3.1 Disagreement in Relation to Metaethical Theories .....	10
1.3.2 The Four Conditions .....	13

## Part I: The Four Conditions

2 The Explanatory Condition .....	19
2.1 Explaining and Defending the Condition .....	19
2.2 Testing Metaethical Views Against the Condition .....	20
2.2.1 Undiluted Speaker Subjectivism .....	20
2.2.2 Undiluted Social Group Subjectivism .....	23
2.2.3 Metaethical Relativism .....	24
2.2.4 Non-Naturalist Moral Realism .....	29
2.2.5 Naturalist Moral Realism .....	31
2.3 Summary of Chapter 2 .....	32
3 The Metaphysical Condition .....	35
3.1 Explaining and Defending the Condition .....	35
3.2 Testing Metaethical Views Against the Condition .....	40
3.2.1 Metaethical Contextualism .....	40
3.2.2 Ecumenical Expressivism .....	43
3.3 Summary of Chapter 3 .....	47
4 The Semantic Condition .....	49
4.1 Explaining and Defending the Condition .....	49

4.2	Testing Expressivism Against the Condition .....	50
4.2.1	Expressivism and the Frege-Geach Problem .....	51
4.2.2	Back to the Semantic Condition .....	53
4.2.3	The Negation Problem Unleashed .....	55
4.2.4	Schroeder's Solution: Being For .....	61
4.3	Summary of Chapter 4 .....	68
5	The Epistemological Condition .....	71
5.1	Explaining and Defending the Condition .....	71
5.1.1	The Debate in Epistemology .....	72
5.1.2	The Epistemology of Moral Disagreement .....	75
5.2	Testing Metaethical Views Against the Condition .....	85
5.2.1	Metaethical Relativism Revisited .....	86
5.2.2	Metaethical Contextualism and Expressivism Revisited .....	88
5.2.3	Non-Naturalist Moral Realism Revisited .....	90
5.2.4	Naturalist Moral Realism Revisited .....	91
5.2.5	Ecumenical Expressivism Revisited .....	92
5.2.6	Moral Error Theory .....	93
5.2.7	Anti-Realists .....	95
5.3	Summary of Chapter 5 .....	100
6	Where Are We? .....	103
6.1	Further Conditions? .....	103
6.1.1	Ridge and Non-Linguistic Agents .....	103
6.1.2	Enoch and the "Argument from Objectivity" .....	106
6.1.3	Summary of Section 6.1 .....	119
6.2	Status of the Views Discussed so far .....	120
6.2.1	Undiluted Speaker Subjectivism .....	120
6.2.2	Undiluted Social Group Subjectivism .....	121
6.2.3	Metaethical Relativism .....	122
6.2.4	Non-Naturalist Moral Realism .....	122
6.2.5	Naturalist Moral Realism .....	123
6.2.6	Metaethical Contextualism .....	123
6.2.7	Ecumenical Expressivism .....	124
6.2.8	Expressivism .....	125
6.2.9	Moral Error Theory .....	125
6.3	Moral Realism Is the Way to Go .....	126

## Part II: Toward A New Account

7	An Account that Meets the Four Conditions .....	129
7.1	.....	129
7.1.1	Introduction .....	130
7.1.2	The State of Play and Hume's "Motivation Argument" .....	130
7.1.3	Hume's Account of Moral Judgment .....	132
7.1.4	Hume on the Motivational Inertia of Belief .....	139
7.1.5	Hume on Morality and Motivation .....	142
7.1.6	Summary of Section 7.1 .....	147
7.2	Sentimentalist Realism .....	148
7.2.1	Sentimental Convergence .....	149
7.2.2	Sentimentalist Reduction .....	155
7.2.3	Sentimentalist Semantics .....	156
7.2.4	Challenges for Sentimentalist Realism .....	159
7.3	Sentimentalist Realism and the Four Conditions .....	160
7.3.1	Meeting the Explanatory Condition .....	160
7.3.2	Meeting the Metaphysical Condition .....	162
7.3.3	Meeting the Semantic Condition .....	163
7.3.4	Meeting the Epistemological Condition .....	164
7.4	Summary of Chapter 7 .....	167
8	Other Metaethical Problems .....	169
8.1	Naturalism and the Open Question Argument .....	169
8.2	The Practicality of Morality .....	170
8.3	Moral Testimony and Changing Moral Views .....	175
8.4	Why not Non-Naturalism? .....	176
8.5	Summary of Chapter 8 .....	177
9	Conclusion .....	179
	References .....	183